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Abstract. World food production is facing exorbitant challenges like climate change, use of 
resources, population growth, and dietary changes. These, in turn, raise major ethical and 
political questions, such as how to uphold the right to adequate nutrition, or the right to enact 
a gastronomic culture and to preserve the conditions to do so. Proposals for utopic solutions 
vary from vertical farming and lab meat to diets filled with the most fanciful insects and 
seaweeds. Common to all proposals is a polarized understanding of food and diets, famously 
captured by Warren Belasco in the contraposition between technological fixes and 
anthropological fixes. According to the first, technology will deliver clean, just, pleasurable, 
affordable food; future generations will not need to adjust much of their dietary cultures. 
According to the second, future generations should dramatically change their dietary habits 
(what they eat and how they eat it) to achieve a sustainable diet. The two fixes found 
remarkably distinct perspectives over dietary politics and the ethics of food production and 
consumption. In this paper we argue that such polarized thinking rests on a misrepresentation 
of the ontological status of food, which in turn affects the underlying ethical and political 
issues. Food is a socially constructed object that draws in specific ways on habits, norms, 
traditions, geographical, and climatic conditions. Although this thesis seems somewhat 
obvious, its consequences on the ethical and political perspectives on the future of food have 
not been derived properly. After introducing the issue at stake (§1), we point out the 
polarities that characterize food utopias (§2) and their ontological faults (§3). We hence 
suggest that a socio-ontological analysis of food can better deliver the principles for a 
foundation of food utopias (§4). 
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§0. Introduction 
The past few decades saw a radical transformation of key ecological aspects of our planet and 
it is known that food production plays a major role in these changes. Climate change, scarcity 
and pollution of resources like water and soil, global changes in lifestyle and population 
growth pose ethical and political challenges to future diets. Nearly all the relevant actors 
invested in food production agree that, as we look forward, we must deeply rethink human 
diets.  
Proposals for how to fix human diets and make them sustainable abound. Utopic food 
scenarios vary from vertical farming and lab-grown meat to diets filled with fanciful insects 
and seaweed. Managing resources in these circumstances does not only mean facing hunger 
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and malnutrition, different cultures and identities in terms of diet, but also our dependence on 
the specific conditions that certain habitats impose. A common denominator of the prevalent 
proposals starts with a polarized understanding of foods and diets. Belasco 2008: 105-123 
distinguishes two kinds of approaches to the future of human diets: the technological fix and 
the anthropological fix. According to the first, technology will deliver clean, just, pleasurable, 
affordable foods; future generations will not need to adjust much of their dietary cultures. 
According to the second, future generations should dramatically change their eating habits 
(what they eat and how they eat it) to achieve a sustainable diet.  
We believe that the polarized thinking characterizing current debates about the ethics 
and politics of food utopias rests on a misrepresentation of the ontological status of food. 
Technological fixes convey the idea that each food can be food for everyone, since a 
universal technology can feed humanity in spite of social differences. Anthropological fixes, 
instead, assume that a universal moral change can save humanity from food crises, regardless 
of social differences among communities. Both fixes disregard basic ontological aspects of 
food, which are best appraised when we consider its social status. Food, as we shall argue, is 
not the same for everyone everywhere and at any time, but it is instead a socially constructed 
object that draws on habits, norms, traditions, geographical, and climatic conditions. 
Although this thesis seems obvious, its ontological consequences have not been derived 
properly.  
We maintain that to model effective solutions for sustainable food production and 
consumption a stronger ontological account of food is needed. After introducing the issue at 
stake (§1), we point out the polarities that characterize food utopias (§2) and their ontological 
misrepresentation (§3). We hence provide arguments that should undermine the idea that a 
food is either a natural or a technological item (§4), since a similar ontological revision could 
provide a better understanding of contemporary challenges related to the future of food, and 
therefore enhance their effectiveness. 
  
§1. The Future of Food: Technological and Anthropological Fixes 
Any proposal for feeding the planet is shaped on the basis of implicit assumptions about what 
food is or must be. Within the debate about the future of food, some enduring positions can 
be found, at least during the last two centuries. Following Belasco, we label such positions 
the technological fix and the anthropological fix, respectively. These fixes presuppose 
conceptions of food sometimes so polarized to appear as mutually exclusive. In particular, 
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some specific polarities seem to be recurrent and form the bedrock for diverging narratives 
about human diets to come. In this section we outline such polarities. 
The technological fix is usually characterized by a Promethean tension and by 
cornucopian expectations: it is an expression of a faith in cutting-edge technology and in 
human ingenuity, that will always be able to guarantee a «bigger pie» for everybody (Belasco 
2006: IX), disproving any warning about overpopulation and scarcity of resources.  
With a focus on demand rather than on resources, letting «the markets work» (Belasco 
2008: 115) is the way in which technological fixes make more food and develop substitutes 
for our diets, even in threatening environmental conditions. Technology is seen as the way 
out of a damaged environment and of a nature that shows its deficiency. The solution rests in 
the trust that humans can remake nature, in an ameliorated version1. The faith in smart tools 
is often combined with the belief that humans can control nature (so much so that they can 
claim intellectual property rights over parts of nature — e.g. as in the especially important 
case of patents).  
When more technology is considered the only way to solve problems — from global 
hunger to food waste — we are facing the technological fixing scenario. The term was 
originally intended to indicate the reframing of a social problem as a technological by 
reducing them to «manageable levels» (Scott 2011: 209).  
Two sorts of criticisms can be advanced with regard to technological fixes: a 
philosophical criticism and a practical criticism (Scott 2011: 210-215). The first maintains 
that the unforeseen bad outcomes sometimes produced by technological fixes derive from 
their pattern of problem solving, which goes no further than applying the same approach that 
created the issue. The solution is, thus, only apparent: a real fix would require a change of 
paradigm that technological fixes cannot provide. Technological fixes tacitly imply an idea of 
progressive and cumulative knowledge, according to which social progress is inherent in any 
scientific or technological advancement. The predictive power of science is idealized, as well 
as its capacity of control over nature. The philosophical criticism challenges the dominant 
uncritical commitments to techno-scientific progress as the only way to solve our problems. 
However, we should not confuse this criticism with a more generic anti-scientific attitude: the 
criticism specifically refuses to «dismissively label innovation as mere technological fixes», 
recognizing our «social bias in favor of technology» (Scott 2011: 208).  
                                               
1 And this, to some, would even increase biodiversity on Earth (see Borghini 2019). 
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The practical criticism, instead, rests on three convictions: (i) technological fixes tend 
not to solve problems; rather, (ii) they create new problems, while (iii) preserving and 
extending the life of systems «that should be abandoned in favor of better alternatives» (Scott 
2011: 215). Even when data suggest the success of a technology, the criteria for defining 
success strongly influence the verdict. Usually, the narrower is the framing of the problem, 
the greater the technological success will be; the triumph, however, would fade away on a 
wider or long term perspective. Looking back at the Green Revolution of 1950s and 1960s 
can offer a good example of the three convictions of the practical criticism. The so called 
revolution was hailed as an epochal change in agriculture, involving also developing 
economies and confirming the leading role of scientific research in solving problems related 
to food production. Undoubtedly, the Green Revolution ended up increasing world food 
production; however, (i) it did not solve the problem of hunger, but simply relocated and 
delayed it, while (ii) generating new social and environmental negative outcomes. Moreover, 
(iii) the Green Revolution could not by itself solve the problem of hunger because it re-
proposed the same structural system in which it arose, just with an improved technology.  
Another notable example of technological fixes is vertical farming, i.e., high tech 
greenhouses stacked up into skyscrapers, where food — but also drugs and fuel — grow into 
a controlled environment artificially providing heat, water, and light. The example illustrates 
how major environmental issues caused by industrial agriculture are approached as «a matter 
of biology«» (Pollan 2008: 8) rather than culture or politics. In the vertical farming utopia, 
horizontal farming is depicted as an obsolete, dangerous practice that urges for a smart 
revolutionary turn: typical of technological fixes is a vision of nature as insufficient, 
dangerous, a variable to control, or even dominate (Belasco 2008: 115). In this vision, food 
(like everything man-made) is artificial. It can always be ameliorated, in order to embody 
seemingly mutually exclusive properties: it can be tasty, convenient, and healthy for the 
consumer and for the planet at once. 
Techno-cornucopian utopias are criticized for being a manifestation of hybris by the 
advocates of the other sort of fixes, the anthropological ones. Anthropological fixes aim to 
change economic and social structures through the adoption of different values and ambitions 
by consumers and producers.  
When it comes to dining, anthropological fixes carried forward certain beliefs regarding 
food economics, the nature of food, and food culture. For food economics, the fixes rest on 
the acceptance of the true cost of food, alongside the rejection of a global food system built 
on cheapness, in which the pursuit of discounted food to feed the world rests on certain 
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desirable outputs (e.g. more calories for everybody, regardless of how and where they are 
produced). With respect to the nature of food, the fixes rest on the rejection of the ideal of a 
perfect produce, which only a standardization of biological features can guarantee. Finally, 
when it comes to food culture, fixes demand the willingness to devote time and energy to 
being a conscious consumer, alongside the willingness to live with fewer choices, such as 
seasonal and local food only. Thus, anthropological fixes aspire to solve our conflictual 
dietary demands at the level of consciousness. 
One powerful example of how the technological and the anthropological fixes differ in 
their framing of food challenges is the dietary shift currently taking place at the global level. 
In recent years, urbanization has qualitatively altered food consumption patterns: higher 
urban incomes of newly industrialized countries fuelled a dietary transition from starchy 
staples to vegetable oils, fruits and vegetables, stimulants, and — most importantly — animal 
proteins (FAO 2017). How to address the environmental costs of meat consumption and the 
feed-to-food conversion efficiency? On the one hand, anthropological fixes promote a mostly 
plant based diet and more awareness in consumers’ purchasing; on the other, technological 
fixes promote scientific research on laboratory produced meat, with the technique of cell 
cultures, or hybrid rice grown with diluted seawater, even in desertic soil.  
Technological and anthropological fixes showcase a more general characteristic of the 
ways in which the future of food is typically conceived, namely a sort of polarized thinking. 
In the next section, we go deeper in the analysis of polarized thinking and its underlying 
ontological assumptions.    
 
§2. Ontological Shortcomings 
The previous section introduced the polarities through which we conceptualize food. What 
separates food from the rest of edible things — is it just a matter of nutritional values or does 
it depend on culture? Is food the primal way to experience nature or an example of human’s 
artifact?  
 A polarized understanding of food is prima facie a fitting explanatory lens of the 
challenges to future human diets. Yet, we maintain, at a closer analysis it is a distorting lens, 
which caused and still causes much trouble. To start illustrating the problem, consider the 
suggestion to make insects a major staple for all humans. Focusing on insects to meet the 
protein needs of a growing population is considered a sustainable foodways, to be contrasted 
with the ecological wastefulness of meat production. If considered as a change of dietary 
habits, like the replacement of the Western aversion towards entomophagy (Looy et al. 2013) 
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with the adoption and creation of recipes involving insects, it is an anthropological fix. 
However, many see in insects only a nutritional value, and have thus proposed to change their 
shape and aesthetics — e.g. turning them into flour — as well as the technology used to grow 
them. In these cases, we have an approach akin to a technological fix, which tries to solve a 
problem — sustainable proteins production — without focusing on its origin. Consuming 
insects would not really entail change in our diet and in our ethics of dieting because the real 
change would be hidden from the eyes of the consumers, confined to the label as a novel 
ingredient but not challenging their menus and more broadly, their food ontologies. Parallel 
considerations apply to imitation foods such as impossible meats, namely meat made of 
vegetables that imitate the flavor, taste, and consistency of meat. So, is eating insects an 
anthropological or a technological fix? Is it both? But, if so, what is the difference between 
the two poles?  
The peculiar role that food plays in our everyday life makes it a distinctive entity, 
whose understanding confronts conundrums and contrasts. The mostly stressed oppositions 
see food as either nutrition or culture, or as either a natural or an artificial entity. But, 
actually, siding with any of these opposing categories — although seemingly justifiable — 
yields a misleading picture of the subject matter.  
On one hand, food is nutrition when conceived as a basic needs, a substance with 
objective quantifiable properties necessary to sustain life. In an even narrower sense, food is 
the fuel for our bodies. On the other hand, food is culture when it is considered a symbol, an 
expression of collective and individual identity, which is value-laden. In this sense, food is 
also something normative, because we divide up the world into food categories that follow 
social norms. Thus, for instance, the predicate “being food” applies to certain entities, but not 
to others. For instance, we tell apart good food from bad food and we can associate certain 
foods to specific groups of people more generally, specific foods historically comprise 
culinary cultures, which we can organize into gastro-nomies, namely systems of dining norms 
(Fischler 1979). 
Imagining the future of food, the advocates of the technological fix tend to think about 
food in the nutritional dimension only. They focus on yields, production per acre, minimal 
caloric requirement, framing the problem of feeding the world in terms of input and output. 
The fixes to hunger and malnutrition are delegated to the quest for innovations, such as 
growing  rice with salty water or salad without sunlight, producing meat in laboratory, or 
thickening food with cricket’s powder. Technological fixes value food for its basic function 
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neglecting the fact that it always «overflows with symbolic significance» (Mintz 2002: 28). 
Given that food is its nutrient components, it can be broken down and re-made.  
Conversely, anthropological fixes by and large privilege the cultural dimension of food. 
The major criticism that can be moved towards them is the charge of naturalistic fallacy, 
namely the assumption that what is natural is good. Anthropological fixes start with the 
accusation that techno-fixes generate food that is dangerous because in some sense it is 
artificial, like so called frankenfoods (genetically engineered foods). Anthropological fixes 
aim to change people’s behaviour by insisting on the importance of choosing foods that are 
unspoiled, simple, and — ultimately — natural. It is not clear, however, what naturalness 
really means and it can be cunningly twisted in multiple ways (Siipi 2008, Sagoff 2001, 
Miller 2017).  
The most frequent usage of the concept of natural applied to food comprehends two 
contrary positions, both treating naturalness as an «all-or-nothing affair» (Siipi 2008). (i) 
Nature is the totality of things — since everything depends on the laws and principles that 
govern this totality, everything is natural. Artificial food is therefore super-natural: since it 
follows nature’s own method, it can be considered a regular development of what is natural  
(Sagoff 2001). (ii) Nature is what is independent from human influence: today there is 
nothing truly natural or pristine. Everything is connected to humans’ activity and, therefore, 
is artificial. Other interpretations consider (un)naturalness as a continuous gradient (Siipi 
2008), valuing something as more natural as it is more independent from cultural action and 
human influence — or more spontaneous than something else. Food can be also considered 
natural when it shares properties with something that is considered natural by itself, because 
of its history or its normality (statistical or functional). A tomato engineered in a biotech 
laboratory could appear natural or unnatural depending on the conception of naturalness 
taken into consideration: whether what counts is its origin — the lab or the organic farm? — 
or its properties — are its genes identical to those of the organic tomato? — we will end with 
different judgements.  
Given the different conceptions of naturalness, the same food can be regarded as 
natural or not depending on the context. The upshot is that the natural/artificial polarity 
cannot be easily trusted upon to characterize food, because in the absence of lengthy and 
subtle specifications it is vague to the point of being meaningless. Therefore, the 
anthropological fix fails when it polarizes (and moralizes) the understanding of food between 
the poles artificial/natural.  
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Thinking of our future dietary options in terms of oppositions delivers, thus, scenarios 
that misunderstand constitutive aspects of food ontologies . Models regarding food as, e.g., a 
nutrient (technological fix) or as an element of nature (anthropological fix) are bound to 
propagate dietary sufferance and food injustice. In the next section we illustrate some of 
those negative consequences, while offering some principles that would deliver a non-
polarized model of food ontologies.  
 
§3. Towards an Ontological Foundation of Future Diets: The Social View of Food  
To amend the errors embedded in a polarized conception of food we are in need of a clearer 
ontological model of a dietary scenario. In this section, we outline important ideas and 
principles that, according to us, shall comprise such a model. We call our view the Social 
View of Food. To present it, we shall first introduce a different yet related perspective, which 
we label the Sustenance View of Food.   
According to the Sustenance View, food is independent of any sort of social reality, 
e.g. a group, a norm, or an institution. Whatever theory of social entities we buy into, and 
however we look at social entities, food’s features —  e.g. its nutritional value, its flavour and 
taste —  are set up neither by a social act, such as an agreement, nor by people that have a 
social bearing with it, e.g., communities that can confer a special status to a given object. On 
the Sustenance View rest a great deal of our ontological models of food, e.g. all those models 
that see food only as a bearer of nutrients. 
Key to our intended model of food is that the Social View is not built in opposition to 
the Sustenance View; rather, the former complements the latter. As we already remarked, 
boundaries between natural and non-natural features are context-sensitive and conceptually 
blurry. Building upon this, the Social View consider food as a mixture of natural as well as 
social features. With social feature we intend a feature that stems from a social relation 
(Lewis 1969; Searle 1995, 2010; Gilbert 2013; Epstein 2018), that is a relation among 
(typically human) agents that depends upon their individual and collective intentionality.2 
Typical cases of social relations include norms (e.g. behavioural, linguistic, legal) and 
practices, such as making a dish and registering its recipe.  
To bring water to and further illustrate the Social View of Food we shall proceed by 
absurdum, supposing that, contrary to what the Social View claims, food is generated 
independently of collective intentionality. If that would indeed be the case, then either food 
                                               
2 What is collective intentionality is disputed, for an introductory survey see Epstein 2018.  
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would have a private foundation (call this the Private View of Food) or it would have a 
natural origin (call this the Natural Origin View of Food). These two views are not 
equivalent. The Natural Origin, but not the Private view, requires that the entity in question 
satisfies an independent natural standard. According to the Private View, instead, an entity is  
food even in case it cannot be eaten by anyone but the actual diner. Thus, according to the 
Private View, something is a food if it has at least one human or non-human diner. According 
to the Natural Origin View, something is food by its own nature, e.g., if a plant discovered by 
a spacecraft on a different planet would satisfy a standard of edibility with respect to 
nutrients, texture, temperature, size, etc. it would count as food, even though no one actually 
ever ate it. Under both scenarios, collective intentionality would play no causal or 
metaphysical role in characterizing some entity as  food and, thus, food would not count as a 
social entity3.  
Both the Natural Origin View and the Private View face substantial challenges. Let us 
consider those regarding the Private View first. In the case in which an entity is food if it has 
a private foundation, every possible entity could count as food. The only required condition 
would be that someone is eating or could/did/will eat such entity. So, even a stone could be a 
food for a human diner, e.g., consider the documented cases of litophagia. Or, perhaps more 
strikingly, confusing, when a human being would unwillingly eat an unusually poisonous 
entity, that would count as food. If so, either we concede that everything could be food as 
long as it has or had/will/could have at least a diner, or we drop out this interpretation.   
The Private View, thus, takes into account individual agency, but fails to consider 
individual biological needs in terms of nutrition and safety. Can the Social View do any 
better? Could the same counterexamples used against the Private View be used against the 
Social View? Clearly, we could imagine an entire community conferring the status of food to 
a poisonous entity.  
In answer to these worries, one may hold the prescriptive principle that a community 
shall never allow that, for once it has been established that an entity is poisonous, the 
community shall rule out such entity as a food since it would jeopardise the survival of the 
community itself. Such a principle has been observed also as a matter of fact. Typically, 
communities try to remove poisonous entities from future diets (Korthals 2002; Winne 2005), 
also in keeping with the constitutive rule that diets shall not foreclose the possibility of the 
                                               
3 This does not entail that foods are not among the constituents of social entities, e.g., dinners, parties, and so on, 
but that they are at most non-social constituents of such entities.   
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community to perdure across time, as Redfield (1960: 4) argued4. Thus, unlike the Private 
View, the Social View could argue against taking nutritionally useless, harmful or poisonous 
entities as food, since it admits the crucial role of food for the survival of the community5.  
Let us now move to consider the Natural Origin View. At first sight, this view is free 
from the counterexample we just examined: it rules out the possibility of poisonous food 
since it relies on the existence of a natural standard that dictates what counts as a food. 
Accordingly, a food is not generated by a collective or a private intention toward a specific 
entity. Rather, there would exist a set of features that an entity should hold in order to be a 
food. Clearly, a poisonous entity would be left out, for it cannot meet even the minimal 
requirements. Yet, what are such minimal requirements? As J. M. Burdick 2014: 2097 puts it 
a food is «any substance consumed which provides nutritional support for the body» and 
produced by means of certain procedures. Also the FAO, in defining “food security”, stresses 
the nutritional function of food in terms of energy for an active and healthy life, recognizing 
also the food preferences of the diners. Accordingly, food is an object whose properties align 
human needs of energy and preferences.   
 Although on the surface it appears to be a good candidate to set the natural standard of 
food, FAO’s definition is inadequate in many ways — as others pointed out6. Accordingly, 
we contend that such definition falls short to deliver a right characterization of food for there 
is not a universal standard of nutrition independent of social relations. Indeed, a universal 
standard of nutrition is supposed to meet the needs of each person only on the basis of their 
own physiological conditions, independently of their (1) social activities, (2) gender, (3) 
socio-economic conditions. Instead, nutritional needs are strongly affected by each of those 
social aspects. We are not disputing that there are nutritional standards, nor that physiological 
conditions do not contribute to establishing them. We are rather arguing that even though a 
food can be defined as an entity that meets a nutritional standard, such standard is settled by 
                                               
4 For more about the definition of community and its relatedness with persistence over time see, inter alia, 
Rapport (2002: 173-177).  
5 The Social View may seem not to take into account individual preferences and less healthful preferences. On 
the contrary, it is a perfect match to them. An enough diversified community would encourage diversified 
preferences among people and inner social groups. Preferences are at least partially socially constructed 
(Fischler 1988; Kosmeyer 1999: 89-94), namely individual preferences and the preferences of the group one 
belongs to usually align well. With regard to less healthful preference, even those can be explained in terms of 
social practices, such as the social identification with a group, the reaction to social exclusion, price, and so on 
(Chen 2016). The Social View does not devalue the physiological import of choosing food, it supplements it 
with a social framework.  
6 See, among them, Pogge (2016) who argues that FAO definition fails to meet environmental and social 
condition in which food is eaten and, overall, it devalues the biological needs other than energy.  
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physiological properties as well as by social relations. Let us motivate our view by 
illustrating how the three social aspects aforementioned affect such standard. 
(1) Social activities. The nutritional needs of an individual rely on her activities and 
lifestyle. As Pogge (2016: 11) points out, a sedentary lifestyle demands nearly 1800 daily 
kcal, whereas a homeworker daily need is far greater. Pogge shows that by an easy 
experiment: his calories consumption when he goes to the gym is 600 kcal in a 60-minute 
workout, and hence he concludes that «workers working merely half as hard as I do in the 
gym, and this for merely 6 hours per day, thus burn an extra 1800 kcal per day over and 
above the sedentary minimum». Hence, social activities affect the natural standard. So, it 
cannot be considered a pure natural standard. 
(2) Gender. A universal standard of nutrition fails to grant how and how much the 
standard itself is affected by bias regarding one’s gender. When each gender is supposed to 
have a constant natural standard of nutrition due exclusively to the physiological properties of 
its members, the risk to naturalize cultural factors is high. Studying gender differences in 
food choices highlights that the kind and quantity of nutrients humans introduce is far from 
being just a matter of sustenance, but is rather expression of a «complex human behaviour 
[…] influenced by many interrelating factors ranging from biological mechanism and genetic 
profiles to social and cultural factors» (Argarini et al. 2012: 84).  For instance, within the 
post-industrialized countries, the female standard of nutrition is affected by what Isaacs calls 
«thinspiration», i.e., the inspiration to be thin and to lose constantly weight, spread by 
popular media. Such standard, Isaacs (2018: 576) contends, «divert(s) women’s energy away 
from participating equally in their private, social, and public lives». Hence, the natural 
standard of nutrition is affected by discriminatory account of gender. Once again, it cannot be 
considered a pure natural standard.  
(3) Socio-economic conditions. Such conditions deeply sways a number of aspects of 
food. For instance, convenience is taken to be one of the prominent features of deciding on 
which food to produce, buy, and consume (Thompson 2010: 31-36). Nevertheless, there 
should be a basic natural nutritional need which is the same for all human beings. Those who 
endorse the universality of nutritional needs may allow that the nutritional needs partly 
depend on what a person wants to do with her life — the so called wants-needs dynamic 
(Hamilton 2003: 67-68). An athlete has different nutritional needs than a person who leads a 
sedentary life. Nevertheless, both the athlete and the sedentary person have the same basic 
nutritional needs to sustain life. Prima facie, there is a common vital basic nutritional need 
that does not draw on socio-economic conditions, but that is determined only by 
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physiological conditions. Despite appearances, socio-economic conditions affect the 
nutritional needs in unexpected ways. They indeed contribute to define specific locations of 
consumption and specific personal nutritional needs. 
Regarding the location, as Pogge (2016: 10-11) points out, people with scarce food 
resources in less economically industrious countries suffer often of iodine-deficiency, which 
prevents intellectual development and physical growth. Iodine turns out to be redundant or 
useless in order to sustain life in an empty space, since there are no particular behaviours to 
be performed there. In a complex space, instead, iodine is fundamental to sustain life7. Hence, 
at least partially, the nutritional needs are derived from the location in which a life is lived.  
Nutritional needs are affected by socio-economic status too and cannot be standardized 
according to an abstract set of nutrients that each person should introject. For instance, a 
person who follows a plant-based diet needs less calcium than omnivorous people, since the 
need of calcium increases with protein intake (Rossi and Garner 2016). Hence, nutritional 
needs are partly necessitated by the choice of a diet. They also vary according to the 
absorption capacity of each person: a person who absorbs better and more nutrients has 
different nutritional needs than a person who absorbs worse and less nutrients from the same 
food. Factors that can undertake nutrient absorption could be also social ones: some people 
absorb less nutrients from food for they are infected by parasites that can consume up to 33% 
of the nutrients a person can ingest (Pogge 2016:11).  
Thus, it is impossible to define a natural standard of nutrition, for nutritional needs are 
always influenced by social aspects8. 
 
§3.1 A Food’s Identity Depends on Its Diners 
We shall now proceed by considering some apparent advantages of the Sustenance View over 
the Social View, and rebutting each of them we are offering a positive picture of the Social 
View. 
The first apparent advantage is that the Sustenance View is more in keeping with our 
ordinary creed that foods are mind-independent entities (Thomasson 2003; Elder 2014). That 
is, social entities always need human beings who believe in their existence (Searle 1995, 
2007; Thomasson 2007), whereas food does not. Consider a world inhabited by unconscious 
human beings permanently asleep in a vat and fed by a drip. Such a world would be devoid of 
                                               
7 It can be generalized to each nutrient.  
8 A different route of argument for the same conclusion would start not from the food, but rather from the 
diner’s desire to introject food (cfr. Borghini 2016). Such a line of argument is, however, less explored and we 
shall leave it for another occasion.   
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social entities, such as institutions, contracts, parties, societies. And yet, there would be food 
in this world, that is the substance contained in the drips9. So we have a counterexample to 
the thesis that food is a social entity, as maintained by the Social View.  
We will contend that the alleged counterexample relies on a misconception of what a 
food is. This misconception draws on the very widespread creed that containing nutrients is a 
necessary and a sufficient condition to be a food. Hence, we have two claims to discuss: 
every nutritious entity is a food and every food is a nutritious entity.  
Not every nutritious entity is a food. In order to be food, an entity must meet several 
other constraints: size (it cannot be too big, e.g., a planet); temperature (it cannot be too cold 
or too hot, above or below the human range of tolerance); consistency (it cannot be too hard, 
e.g., a stone); absence of poisonous elements (it cannot give sudden death, e.g., a poisonous 
apple). Consider a roast dog. It holds all the nutrients a human being can need as well as it 
complies with all the other constraints. Nonetheless, a roast dog is not a food for most people, 
but it is or has been for others. Thus, what is food depends on a human being’s mindset, 
which is shaped by its social interactions.  
Not every food is nutritious. The host usually eaten at Catholic mass cannot be any 
longer considered a food both for its quantity — it weighs 0,5 g — and for its nutrients — it 
holds only 0,2 kcal. Nevertheless, it is a paradigmatic food for Catholic believers. Thus, to be 
a food for a host is to be recognized as a food by the believers. Other entities that we consider 
edible while lacking nutritional value include  vitamin supplements (and other drugs), spices, 
and  chewing gums. Spices and chewing gums typically do not add nutritional value, 
although they can largely influence consumption. They are, nonetheless, typically found in 
food stores and serve to characterize culinary cultures and eating habits. Vitamin 
supplements, on the other hand, exemplify the blurry line between foods and drugs. They 
count as breakfast items in several countries (and they provide  nutrients); but, they do not 
provide the characteristic sensory stimulation associated with food, especially with respect to 
smell and taste.  
Hence, some tasty yet non-nutritious items are regarded as foods, while some  
nutritious items are regarded as non-foods Such conclusion entails as corollary that food is 
something over and above its nutrients, and although we are not arguing that nutritional value 
                                               
9 The mental experiment of human beings artificially fed by a drip could be ruled out by who does not see it as a 
possible option. In this case, there would be even more reasons to endorse the view that nutrients are neither 
sufficient, nor necessary in order for something to be a food.  
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does not matter we maintain that such over and above is constituted by its social status10 and 
that is not possible to eliminate it while considering what food is. Food is somehow always 
dependent on human agency.  
   
§3.3 A Food’s Identity Depends on Its Function  
The second apparent advantage of the Sustenance View over the Social View is that social 
entities do not have any function whatsoever independently of an assignment of function by a 
human being (Millikan 1999: 205; Thomasson 2007; Searle 2007), whereas foods do have a 
function independently of any assignment. For instance, an agreement’s termination clauses 
have the function of putting an end to the agreement under certain circumstances. Food has 
the function to feed a diner whether she wants it or not, and whether she knows it or not.  
As Searle (1995: 124, 2010: 8) points out, any function depends on a human beings’ 
assignment. According to him, the function of an entity is to reach a predetermined aim 
settled by human beings. We can understand the function of an entity only once an 
assignment is settled and we know what assignment has been given. In the food case, the 
consumption of food causes the production of energy that sustains life. Food, thus, is 
functional to sustain life. The fact that life is valuable fits very well with our intuitions. 
However, at a closer scrutiny the fact that life is valuable arises within a normative 
background, which is not the same for everyone at every time. At face value, food can be 
considered as having a useful function only once we endorse the thesis that life is valuable. 
Otherwise, food turns out to be dysfunctional: in the case in which we thought that death is 
the best option for us toxic items would be the functional ones. Hence, the function of an 
entity cannot be evaluated unless its aim is settled and without knowing which aim has to be 
achieved.   
Furthermore, a functional assignment is necessary for building a food ranking that 
ranges from the worst to the best food. There is a ranking for each possible functional 
assignment, besides nutrition: gustatory pleasure (Korsmeyer 1999: 130); religious 
observance; celebration; assertion of values and principles; fostering of unity within a group; 
communication of care and love; exercise in civilization, style, elegance or luxury; artistic 
expression (Telfer 1996: 37-38).  
                                               
10 Another possible answer would be ‘taste’, namely for an object counts as a food is to be tasty. The 
philosophical analysis of taste and it role in defining what food is, is beyond the aim of the paper. See 
Korsmeyer (1999: 90) who strongly argued that even taste is socially constructed from physical and 
physiological facts. 
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Hence, in spite of the apparent natural function of food, even this aspect is socially 
constructed and depends on human beings.  
  
§3.4 A Food’s Identity Depends on Its Location  
The third apparent advantage of the Sustenance View over the Social View is that social 
entities are necessarily partly mentalistically generated (Locke 1690; Pettit 1993; List and 
Pettit 2002), whereas foods can be materially generated in their entirety. Hence, social 
entities’ locations are partly in human minds11 and partly in the external world. Clearly, foods 
as well may be artifactual objects, i.e. objects intentionally made by human beings in order to 
reach an aim (Hilpinen 2011), but this is not a matter of necessity. Some foods are 
spontaneously generated in their entirety, without any human effort, like wild edible plants 
grow on the land and edible animals are born from other edible animals. Unlike social 
entities, which are always brought into existence by human minds out of physical reality, 
foods are wholly located in the external world regardless of any human act.  
Despite its seeming palatable, this position turns out to be false. There are at least two 
reasons for resisting it.  
First, as we argue in §3.3, in order to be a food something has to be given a function by 
human beings: a wild fruit has to be harvested and an animal has to be hunted in order to be 
eaten; thus, there must be a preliminary function assignment by human beings. Yet, of course, 
one can rebut that sometimes such acts are not carried out intentionally; so, there is no 
agency, simply physical action. Hence, these acts are ultimately located in the external world.  
However — and this is the second reason — not every social entity explicitly arises 
within a human mind. That is, some facts seem to be wholly located in the external world, 
when instead they are partly located in the human mind. Consider an economic crisis: 
typically, it is not intentionally generated by human beings; moreover, it does not retain two 
allegedly essential features of social entities: epistemic privileged access (the full knowledge 
of the entity) and ontological control (the power of creating and destroying the entity). 
Human beings cannot usually predict an economic crisis and, even less, they can bring it to 
an end by, say, a mental act. Despite this, economic crises are arguably partly located in 
human minds. As Tuomela (2003: 129) and Thomasson (2009: 549) put it, there are some 
kinds of social entities that are not directly generated by human beings, but nevertheless 
presuppose for their existence some social entities. In the case of an economic crisis, many 
                                               
11 We are not taking a stance on the existence of an object such a ‘mind’. We are employing here this term just 
to label the internal world of human beings made of beliefs, thoughts, intentions, desires.  
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social entities are presupposed, such as banks, currencies, transactions, employers, clients, 
and so on.  
When we consider a food that is allegedly spontaneous, the existence of many social 
entities is constitutive of its being a food. Just to mention a few: background knowledge, 
capabilities, values, desires, preferences, tools, and manners. Let us just address here what 
Korthals calls food capabilities. According to him, «food capabilities consist of critically 
understanding food information, assessing normatively the way food is produced and 
exploring taste components of food. Youngsters have to learn them, and later on as adults to 
maintain them and update them» (2017: 420). That is, an overture towards the ontological 
foundation of food: knowledge of what is a food and what is not, which is appraised from 
elder community members; knowledge of the production process (direct, as in the case of a 
picked fruit, or indirect, as in the case of the fruits one can buy). Hence, even in most exotic 
and weird cases of feeding, there is a social, yet hidden, component to food. Therefore, each 
food is partly mentalistically generated.  
 
§3.5 A Food’s Identity Depends on Its Community 
The fourth apparent advantage of the Sustenance View over the Social View is that social 
entities can vary from one community to another, whereas foods are by and large invariant 
across communities. Social practices overwhelmingly are made by and made for a specific 
community, and every other community would accept or would not accept (and employ) — 
think for example at polygamy. However, even those willing to grant that culture sways or 
shapes foods’ consumption and production and the other way around, should agree in saying 
that unless there are physiological illnesses or diseases, each food can be consumed and 
produced by anyone regardless of her community.  
We shall argue that this view is misguided for two reasons: food is relative to a 
community like any other social entity is; food influences so much human beings that the 
members of a community cannot eat whatever food they want for physiological reasons. Let 
us see them in order. 
 
§3.5.1 Hungry Communities  
A straightforward survey will show us that that each community has its own food and its own 
idiosyncrasies12. We shall not address here for what reasons such differences arose and still 
                                               
12 Just consider the Ḥarām food for muslims and likewise the Kasherùt for Jews.  
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persist nowadays13. We just take them for granted, as well as each community has its own 
institutions, conventions, moral and aesthetic values, and so on. 
As it turns out, political concerns on food are mainly about abolishing hunger 
regardless preserving food diversity, e.g, FAO 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Even the philosophical mainstream concerns on food focus on hunger. For instance, 
Thompson (2015: 106-129) famously maintains that hunger is the main ethical problem about 
food. Thus, solving the problem of food is solving the problem of hunger, in any way we can, 
regardless of culture, religions, institutions, and so on. Accordingly, feeding people is not tied 
to the culture of the people that demand food. Indeed, to impose a diet14 in order to wipe out 
hunger seems less morally questionable than imposing a religion. Since a diet can be imposed 
on people regardless of their culture which is a social entity, then food is not a social entity. 
At least, the social value of food is less important than the social value of, say, religion. The 
underlying assumption is that everyone can eat whatever food is given to her, since the social 
import of food, if any, is not constitutive of its being a food.  
In order to undermine this claim, let us begin with a story.  
 
You get caught by a tribe whose members practice cannibalism. They keep you imprisoned 
for a week without feeding you. After a week you are left with a choice: you can either eat as 
much as you want of a roasted human being or you can eat an apple while also disowning the 
most meaningful faith you have (be it political, religious, metaphysical, or  other). What is 
your decision? 
 
Perhaps you decide to eat the apple and disown a fundamental faith of yours since 
eating a human being would make you a cannibal. But, no one can be sure about human 
behaviour when it is challenged by extreme hunger. History has proven that during peculiar 
and harsh circumstances, what could not be counted as food has become that. The fact that 
even human beings can be food strengthens the thesis that what is food is a social 
construction. Normally we do not look at everything edible as if it were food — other 
humans, but also dogs and insects, depending on our culture — because to be edible is not 
                                               
13 The specific dietary guidelines of each community can be explained in many ways: public health 
explanations, divinely inspiration, ecological and economic reasons, and so on. See Harris 2013: 59-72.   
14 A reviewer notes that diet are not usually imposed. However, a brief survey of the literature on the politics of 
diet and gender (Isaacs 2018; Portman 2018), the treatment of indigenous population (Claeys 2018), the public 
representation of alternative dietary guidelines (Korthals 2012), shows us that the diets have been imposed by 
the social dominant group for a number of reasons, including keeping women under control, enslaving and 
exploiting non-Western communities, and settling the demand on the market. 
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enough. The social import of food matters to us, as much as any other social entity, or 
perhaps even more. Not everything could be a food for everyone and this is due to social 
reasons. Extreme conditions, in which social norms are weakened or lost, can temporarily 
alter how we look at the edible environment, broadening our choices. Moreover, in those 
conditions the very social import of food becomes clearer. As Szymanski points out, when 
food is absent it can be more present than ever, like for the women in the Terezin 
concentration camp, who used to «cook with the mouth», verbalizing and writing recipes that 
perhaps they would never cook again during their night-time gatherings. Food allowed them 
to «develop a sense of the self» (Szymanski 2017: 13) even if it was not physically present. 
 
§3.5.2 The Social Metabolism   
The last reason for endorsing that food is a social entity is a biological one. We shall argue 
that our metabolism is influenced by our social habits much more than we are willing to 
admit. We take here just one case among many, lactose intolerance and cheese consumption.  
Many cuisines in Asia, Africa, and the Americas do not employ cheese and they 
emerged out of communities that did not develop dairying. Notoriously, populations who 
adopted such cuisines were also lactose intolerant. According to a survey by Silanikove et al. 
2015 among groups of adults,  95% of Chinese, 89% of Africans Bantu, 100% of Native 
Americans suffer lactose intolerance, whereas the percentage is significantly smaller among 
Europeans, e.g., 1% of Dutch, 19% of central Italians, 4% Europeans in Australia. According 
to the authors, the reason of the tolerance among Europeans is to be found also in the 
environmental conditions and the cultural choices of early farmers. The authors hold that «the 
spread of dairying in certain populations were genetic niche constructions, derived from a 
mutation in the lactase gene enabling the digestion of lactose by adult human» (Silanikove et 
al. 2015: 7315). Such genetic niche construction —  they maintain — is linked to the animal 
husbandry-cultural traits and it should be understood as gene-culture co-evolution in the 
human-animal relationship, through the advent of agriculture. They point out that the need of 
lactose-forced human organisms to mutate their genetic structure by means of a cultural and 
social adaptation.  
The example of lactose intolerance shows the co-variance of genes and social entities. 
Of course, we are not arguing that all genetic variation may be explained in those terms. Our 
point is that what human populations can metabolize depends at least in part also on 
characteristics related to their societies; thus, foods cannot be defined independently of social 




The future of eating has become a global interest due to the growing awareness about the 
peculiar position of food production in relation to natural systems’ stability. Feeding more 
than 9 billion people is a problem which urges answers, and the most different have been 
given, calling into question antithetical views of humankind, nature, and progress.  
Despite a startling number of suggestions for how to feed humans in the near future, 
neither a convincing solution nor a sound method to diagnose the challenges have been 
secured. Our research goal is to frame the debate on the future of food by developing a 
systematic model representing the very entities we consume; this paper covers the initial 
steps of such a research. If the analysis we offer is correct, proposed solutions for future 
human diets are lacking in terms of their ontological understanding of what food is. We 
outline an ontological framework sustaining the intuition that food is not a mere natural entity 
or a commonplace cultural product, but a sui generis social entity. Especially for food utopias 
that rest on automation and new technologies of production, distribution and consumption, it 
is crucial to provide an ontology that enriches our comprehension of food, rather than one 
that aims to reduce it. But also the view that a global moral change can solve our food 
challenges is typically ill-founded, because it fails to appreciate the complex dependence of 
foods from the biological and cultural environments in which they are developed and 
consumed. It is our conviction that the specific ontological nuances that make food what it is 
must be taken into consideration by everyone interested in the development of a sustainable 
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